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This article is concerned with the Axelrod model, a stochastic
process which similarly to the voter model includes social influence,
but unlike the voter model also accounts for homophily. Each vertex
of the network of interactions is characterized by a set of F cultural
features, each of which can assume q states. Pairs of adjacent vertices
interact at a rate proportional to the number of features they share,
which results in the interacting pair having one more cultural feature
in common. The Axelrod model has been extensively studied during
the past ten years, based on numerical simulations and simple mean-
field treatments, while there is a total lack of analytical results for
the spatial model itself. Simulation results for the one-dimensional
system led physicists to formulate the following conjectures. When
the number of features F and the number of states q both equal
two, or when the number of features exceeds the number of states,
the system converges to a monocultural equilibrium in the sense that
the number of cultural domains rescaled by the population size con-
verges to zero as the population goes to infinity. In contrast, when the
number of states exceeds the number of features, the system freezes
in a highly fragmented configuration in which the ultimate number
of cultural domains scales like the population size. In this article,
we prove analytically for the one-dimensional system convergence to
a monocultural equilibrium in terms of clustering when F = q = 2, as
well as fixation to a highly fragmented configuration when the num-
ber of states is sufficiently larger than the number of features. Our
first result also implies clustering of the one-dimensional constrained
voter model.
1. Introduction. Opinion and cultural dynamics are driven by social in-
fluence, the tendency of individuals to become more similar when they in-
teract, which is the basic mechanism of the voter model introduced indepen-
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dently by Clifford and Sudbury [4] and Holley and Liggett [8]. Social influ-
ence alone usually drives the system to a monocultural equilibrium, whereas
differences between individuals and groups persist in the real world. In his
seminal paper [2], political scientist Robert Axelrod explains the diversity
of cultures as a consequence of homophily, which is the tendency to interact
more frequently with individuals which are more similar. In his model, ac-
tors are characterized by a finite number of cultural features. In Axelrod’s
own words, the more similar an actor is to a neighbor, the more likely that
actor will adopt one of the neighbor’s traits. The network of interactions is
a finite connected graph G with vertex set V and edge set E, where each
vertex x is characterized by a vector X(x) of F cultural features, each of
which assuming q possible states,
X(x) = (X1(x), . . . ,XF (x)),
where
Xi(x) ∈ {1,2, . . . , q} for i= 1,2, . . . , F.
At each time step, a vertex x is picked uniformly at random from the vertex
set along with one of its neighbors y. Then, with a probability equal to the
fraction of features x and y have in common, one of the features for which
states are different (if any) is selected, and the state of vertex x is set equal
to the state of vertex y for this cultural feature. Otherwise nothing happens.
In order to describe more generally the Axelrod dynamics on both finite and
infinite graphs, we assume that the system evolves in continuous-time with
each pair of adjacent vertices interacting at rate one, which causes one of the
two vertices chosen uniformly at random to mimic the other vertex in the
case of an update. This induces a continuous-time Markov process whose
state at time t is a function Xt that maps the vertex set of the graph into
the set of cultures {1,2, . . . , q}F , and whose dynamics are described by the
generator Ωax defined on the set of cylinder functions by
Ωaxf(X) =
∑
x∈V
∑
x∼y
F∑
i=1
1
2F
[
F (x, y)
1−F (x, y)
]
1{Xi(x) 6=Xi(y)}[f(Xiy→x)−f(X)],
where x∼ y means that x and y are connected by an edge,
Xiy→x(x) = (X
1(x), . . . ,Xi−1(x),Xi(y),Xi+1(x), . . . ,XF (x))
and Xiy→x(z) =X(z) for all z 6= x, and
F (x, y) =
1
F
F∑
i=1
1{Xi(x) =Xi(y)}
denotes the fraction of cultural features vertices x and y have in common.
To explain the expression of the Markov generator of the Axelrod model, we
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note that
1
2F
[
F (x, y)
1−F (x, y)
]
= F (x, y)× 1
F (1− F (x, y)) ×
1
2
,
which represents the fraction of features both vertices have in common,
which is the rate at which the vertices interact, times the reciprocal of the
number of features for which both vertices disagree, which is the probability
that any of these features is the one chosen to be updated, times the prob-
ability one half that vertex x rather than vertex y is chosen to be updated.
The two-feature, two-state Axelrod model is also closely related to the
constrained voter model introduced by Va´zquez et al. [11] which identifies
two of the cultures with no common feature to be a centrist opinion, and
the other two cultures to be a leftist and a rightist opinions. This results in
a stochastic process somewhat similar to the voter model except that leftists
and rightists are too incompatible to interact. Thinking of leftist as − state,
centrist as 0 state and rightist as + state, the constrained voter model is
the Markov process whose state at time t is a function Zt that maps the
vertex set of the graph into the opinion set {−1,0,+1}, and whose dynamics
are described by the Markov generator Ωcv defined on the set of cylinder
functions by
Ωcvf(Z) =
1
2
∑
x∈V
∑
x∼y
1∑
ε=−1
1{Z(y) = ε}1{Z(x) 6=−ε}[f(Zx,ε)− f(Z)],
where Zx,ε is the configuration defined by
Zx,ε(z) = ε if z = x and Zx,ε(z) =Z(z) if z 6= x.
In order to understand these opinion and cultural dynamics, we study ana-
lytically the number and mean size of the cultural domains at equilibrium.
The number N(t) of cultural domains at time t is the number of connected
components of the graph obtained by removing all the edges that connect
two vertices that do not share the same culture at time t, while the mean
size S(t) is defined as the mean number of vertices per connected compo-
nent. Note that when the dynamics take place on a finite connected graph,
the mean size of the cultural domains is also equal to the total number of
vertices divided by the number of cultural domains.
The constrained voter model and Axelrod model have been extensively
studied over the past ten years by social scientists as well as statistical
physicists based on numerical simulations and simple mean field treatments,
while there is a total lack of analytical results for the spatial models. We refer
the reader to Sections III.B and IV.A of Castellano et al. [3] for a review, and
references therein for more details about numerical results. Because spatial
simulations are usually difficult to interpret, there is a need for rigorous
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analytical results, and this article is intended to provide analytical proofs of
important conjectures suggested by the simulations, which also gives insight
into the mechanisms that promote convergence to either a monocultural
equilibrium or, on the contrary, a highly fragmented configuration where
cultural domains are uniformly bounded.
Convergence to a monocultural equilibrium. Letting θ denote the initial
density of centrists in the one-dimensional constrained voter model, the
mean-field analysis in [11] suggests that the average domain length at equi-
librium is
lim
t→∞
E(S(t))∼N2ψ(θ) where ψ(θ) =−1
8
+
2
pi2
[
cos−1
(
1− 2θ√
2
)]2
,
when the length N of the system is large. Va´zquez et al. [11] also showed
that these predictions agree with their numerical simulations when the ini-
tial density of centrists is small enough, as indicated by their Figure 5, from
which they conclude that, for small θ, the system ends up with high proba-
bility to a frozen mixture of leftists and rightists. Their simulations, however,
also suggest that a typical final frozen state is characterized by two spatial
scales, with few cultural domains covering macroscopically large fractions of
the universe and a number of small domains. The presence of two spatial
scales also holds for the two-feature two-state Axelrod model. Even though
it was not the conclusion of Va´zquez et al. [11], this somewhat suggests
convergence to a monocultural equilibrium in which the number of cultural
domains does not scale like the population size, that is, the cardinality of the
vertex set. Our first result shows that both the constrained voter model and
the two-feature two-state Axelrod model on the one-dimensional infinite lat-
tice indeed converge to a monocultural equilibrium in terms of a clustering
similar to that of the one-dimensional voter model. This clustering indicates
that the only stationary distributions are the ones supported on the set of
configurations in which all vertices share the same culture.
Theorem 1. Starting from a translation invariant product measure in
which each culture/opinion occurs with positive probability, the one-dimensio-
nal two-feature two-state Axelrod model and the one-dimensional constrained
voter model cluster, that is,
lim
t→∞
P (Xt(x) 6=Xt(y)) = lim
t→∞
P (Zt(x) 6=Zt(y)) = 0 for all x, y ∈ Z.
The apparent contradiction between our analytical result and the numer-
ical results of [11] is due to the fact that, when taking place on a finite
connected graph, the dynamics of the Axelrod model and constrained voter
model may drive the system to a culturally fragmented frozen configura-
tion even though they promote convergence to a monocultural equilibrium,
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which again reveals the difficulty in interpreting spatial simulations and the
need for analytical results.
Fixation to a fragmented configuration. For the one-dimensional Axelrod
model with an arbitrary number of features and states per feature, Vilone et
al. [13] have predicted through the analysis of mean-field approximation sup-
ported by simulation results that convergence to a monocultural equilibrium
occurs when F > q whereas fixation to a highly fragmented configuration oc-
curs when F < q. Our second result establishes partly the latter in the sense
that the expected number of cultural domains at equilibrium on a path-like
graph scales like the length of the graph for an infinite proper subset of the
parameter region F < q.
Theorem 2. Assume that G= {0,1, . . . ,N} and F < q. Then, starting
from a translation invariant product measure in which each culture occurs
with the same probability q−F ,
N−1 lim
t→∞
E(N(t))≥
(
1− 1
q
)F
+
F
q− F
((
1− 1
q
)F
−
(
1− 1
q
))
.
Note that the lower bound for the expected number of cultural domains
also gives an upper bound for the expected length of the cultural domains
since the expected number of domains times their expected length is equal
to the cardinal of the vertex set. Note also that the theorem does not a priori
exclude clustering of the system on the infinite one-dimensional lattice, but
it strongly suggests the latter since it gives upper bounds for the expected
length of the cultural domains which are uniform in the size of the network
of interactions. Finally, we point out that, even though our estimate holds
for all F < q, the theorem does not fully prove the conjecture of [13] since the
lower bound can be negative: to make the coexistence region more explicit
when both parameters are large, we fix F/q = x and notice that the lower
bound in Theorem 2 converges to(
1
x
− 1
)−1(e−x
x
− 1
)
as F →∞.
The equation e−x = x has a unique positive solution given by x0 ≈ 0.567,
which indicates that the one-dimensional Axelrod model coexists in the sense
that the expected number of cultural domains scales like the population size
when F < x0× q and F is large. For explicit conditions for coexistence when
the parameters are small, we refer the reader to Table 1 which gives some
values of the upper bound for the expected length of the cultural domains
at equilibrium.
The intuition behind Theorems 1 and 2 that appears in our proofs can
be interpreted in terms of active versus frozen boundaries between adjacent
6 N. LANCHIER
Table 1
Upper bounds for the expected length of the cultural domains at equilibrium
q = 4 q = 8 q = 12 q = 16 q = 20 q = 24 q = 28 q = 32 q = 36
F = 2 2.6667 1.3714 1.2121 1.1487 1.1146 1.0932 1.0785 1.0679 1.0597
F = 3 neg. 1.8286 1.3861 1.2535 1.1890 1.1508 1.1255 1.1074 1.0940
F = 4 – 3.3629 1.6645 1.3938 1.2810 1.2188 1.1792 1.1519 1.1318
F = 5 – neg. 2.1989 1.5943 1.3985 1.3007 1.2417 1.2022 1.1738
F = 6 – neg. 3.7048 1.9091 1.5552 1.4017 1.3154 1.2599 1.2211
F = 7 – neg. 45.641 2.4851 1.7767 1.5304 1.4040 1.3268 1.2746
F = 8 – – neg. 3.9072 2.1170 1.7007 1.5132 1.4058 1.3360
F = 9 – – neg. 13.637 2.7127 1.9385 1.6514 1.5005 1.4071
cultural domains. Here, we call an active boundary the boundary between
two cultural domains with at least one feature in common. Even though the
infinite system keeps evolving indefinitely, Theorem 2 indicates that for rea-
sonably large values of the number of states q the incompatibility between
adjacent vertices prevents a positive fraction of boundaries to ever become
active, that is, a positive fraction of the boundaries frozen initially stay
frozen at any time. In contrast, the result of Theorem 1 is symptomatic of
a large activity of the system in the sense that each vertex changes its culture
infinitely often which results in the destruction of the frozen boundaries thus
in the presence of cultural domains that keep growing indefinitely. Cultural
dynamics including two features and two states per feature taking place on
finite graphs operate similarly by promoting convergence to a monocultural
equilibrium. However, due to the finiteness of the network of interactions,
the system may fixate before reaching a total consensus in which case the
final frozen configuration is characterized by two spatial scales: cultural do-
mains whose length scales like the size of the system and domains which
are uniformly bounded, as observed in Va´zquez et al. [11]. The rest of the
article is devoted to the proofs.
2. Proof of Theorem 1. Note first that the constrained voter model is
obtained from the two-feature two-state Axelrod model by identifying two
cultures without common features with the centrist opinion, and each of
the other two cultures with the leftist and rightist opinions, respectively.
Therefore the mean cluster size is stochastically larger for the constrained
voter model than the Axelrod model, so it suffices to prove the result for
the latter. To study the probability of a consensus when F = q = 2, but
also the expected number of cultural domains at equilibrium when F < q
in the next section, the idea is to analyze the evolution of the agreements
along the edges rather than the actual opinion at each vertex. The network
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Fig. 1. Coupling between the Axelrod model and the voter model.
can be viewed as a weighted graph where each edge is assigned a weight
that counts the number of features its endpoints have in common. We call
e = {x,x + 1} ∈ E an edge with weight j at time t, or simply a j-edge at
time t, whenever
X¯t(e) =
F∑
i=1
1{Xit(x) =Xit(x+1)}= j.
The key to proving Theorem 1 is to observe that, when F = 2, clustering of
the Axelrod model is equivalent to almost sure extinction of the 1-edges and
the 0-edges. The former follows from the clustering of a certain voter model
coupled with the Axelrod model, while the latter follows from the combi-
nation of the clustering and the site recurrence property of the voter model
that we define below. Before going into the details of the proof, we start
by collecting important results about the connection between the Axelrod
model, the voter model and coalescing random walks.
The first ingredient is to observe, as pointed out by Va´zquez and Red-
ner [12], that one recovers the voter model from the two-feature two-state
Axelrod model by identifying cultures that have no feature in common (see
Figure 1 for simulation pictures of the coupled Axelrod model and voter
model). Indeed, when F = q = 2, we have
Ωaxf(X) =
1
4
∑
x∈Z
∑
x∼y
∑
i 6=j
1{Xi(x) 6=Xi(y)}1{Xj(x) =Xj(y)}
× [f(Xiy→x)− f(X)].
Therefore, letting Y (x) = |X1(x)−X2(x)| for all x ∈ Z and noticing that
{Y (x) 6= Y (y)}=
⋃
i 6=j
{Xi(x) 6=Xi(y)} ∩ {Xj(x) =Xj(y)},
we obtain that {Yt : t≥ 0} is the Markov process with generator
Ωvmf(Y ) =
1
4
∑
x∈Z
∑
x∼y
1{Y (x) 6= Y (y)}[f(Yy→x)− f(Y )],
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where Yy→x is the configuration defined by
Yy→x(z) = Y (y) if z = x and Yy→x(z) = Y (z) if z 6= x.
This indicates that {Yt : t≥ 0} is a time change of the voter model run at
rate 1/2, but since we are only interested in the limiting distribution of the
Axelrod model, we shall for simplicity speed up time by a factor two in order
to get the usual voter model run at rate 1.
The voter model can be constructed graphically using an idea of Harris [7],
which also allows us to exhibit a duality relationship between the voter model
and coalescing random walks. This construction is now standard, so we only
give a brief description. To each vertex x ∈ Z, we attach a Poisson process
with parameter one. Then, at the arrival times of this process, we choose
one of the two neighbors x± 1 uniformly at random, then draw an arrow
from vertex x± 1 to vertex x and put a δ at x to indicate that x updates
its opinion by mimicking x ± 1. The connection between the voter model
and coalescing random walks appears when keeping track of the ancestry
of each vertex going backward in time which also defines the so-called dual
process. We say that there is a dual path from (x,T ) to (y,T − s) if there
are sequences of times and vertices
s0 = T − s < s1 < · · ·< sn+1 = T and x0 = y,x1, . . . , xn = x
such that the following two conditions hold:
(1) for i= 1,2, . . . , n, there is an arrow from xi−1 to xi at time si;
(2) for i= 0,1, . . . , n, the vertical segment {xi} × (si, si+1) does not con-
tain any δ’s.
Then, for A⊂ Z finite, the dual process starting at (A,T ) is the set-valued
process
Yˆs(A,T ) = {y ∈ Z: there is a dual path
from (x,T ) to (y,T − s) for some x ∈A}.
The dual process is naturally defined only for dual times 0 ≤ s ≤ T . How-
ever, it is convenient to assume that the Poisson processes in the graphical
representation are also defined for negative times so that the dual process
can be defined for all s≥ 0. The reason for introducing the dual process is
that it allows one to deduce the state of the process at the current time from
the configuration at earlier times based on the duality relationship
Yt(x) = Yt−s(Yˆs(x, t)) = Y0(Yˆt(x, t)) for all s ∈ (0, t).
Moreover, it can be seen from the graphical representation that the dual
process evolves according to a system of simple symmetric coalescing ran-
dom walks that jump at rate 1, so questions about the voter model can be
answered by looking at this system of coalescing random walks.
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The first step, as previously mentioned, is to establish extinction of the
1-edges, which is directly related to the clustering of the one-dimensional
voter model.
Lemma 3. There is almost sure extinction of the 1-edges, that is,
lim
t→∞
P (X¯t(e) = 1) = 0 for all e ∈E.
Proof. Since the one-dimensional voter model clusters [4, 8], we have
lim
t→∞
P (X¯t({x,x+1}) = 1)
= lim
t→∞
P (X1t (x) 6=X1t (x+1) and X2t (x) =X2t (x+ 1))
+ lim
t→∞
P (X1t (x) =X
1
t (x+ 1) and X
2
t (x) 6=X2t (x+1))
= lim
t→∞
P (Yt(x) 6= Yt(x+ 1)) = 0
for every vertex x ∈ Z, which proves extinction of the 1-edges. In words, the
1-edges in the Axelrod model correspond to the interfaces of the underlying
voter model, which evolve according to a system of annihilating random
walks that, because of clustering, goes extinct. 
The second step is to prove that there is almost sure extinction of the
0-edges, which follows from the combination of clustering and the following
property:
P (Yt(x) 6= Ys(x) for some t > s) = 1 for all x ∈ Z and s > 0
that we shall call site recurrence of the one-dimensional voter model. The
terminology is motivated by the article of Erdo˝s and Ney [6] who conjectured
that, given a system of discrete-time annihilating random walks starting with
one particle at each site except the origin, the probability that the origin
is visited infinitely often is one, property that Arratia [1] called later site
recurrence. The continuous-time version of their conjecture has been proved
by Schwartz [10] based on the connection with the one-dimensional voter
model whose interfaces precisely evolve according to a system of annihilat-
ing random walks. In particular, the idea of her proof is to show that the
one-dimensional voter model starting from a particular deterministic config-
uration is site recurrent in the sense defined above. Her result easily extends
to the process starting from more general random configurations, but we
give a somewhat shorter proof in Lemma 4 below. Note that the site recur-
rence of the voter model in higher dimensions directly follows from the law
of large numbers for the occupation time of the process established in Cox
and Griffeath [5] which does not hold in one dimension.
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Lemma 4. The one-dimensional voter model is site recurrent, that is,
P (Yt(x) 6= Ys(x) for some t > s) = 1 for all x ∈ Z and s > 0.
Proof. The key is to observe that, for all y ∈ Z, the process that keeps
track of the number of vertices at time t that descend from y; namely
Mt(y) := card{z ∈ Z: there is a dual path from (z, t) to (y,0)}
is a martingale absorbed at state 0. Note that, though stated for the one-
dimensional voter model only, this property holds in any spatial dimension.
Since in addition Mt(y) is an integer-valued process, a straightforward ap-
plication of the martingale convergence theorem implies that it converges
almost surely to its absorbing state. Now, let x ∈ Z and s > 0, and define
Φ(s) := inf{t > 0 :Mt(y) = 0} where y := Yˆs(x, s).
Since there is a dual path from (x, s) to (y,0), this stopping time is larger
than s, but almost sure convergence of Mt(y) to zero implies that time Φ(s)
is almost surely finite. In addition,
there is no dual path from (x,Φ(s)) to (y,0)
from which it follows that the spin at (x,Φ(s)) and the spin at (x, s) originate
from different vertices at time 0 and thus are independent since the initial
configuration is distributed according to a product measure. This holds for
all s > 0 hence defining recursively s0 = s and
si+1 := Φ(si) = inf{t > 0 :Mt(y) = 0} where y := Yˆsi(x, si)
for all integers i≥ 0 induces an increasing sequence of stopping times which
are all almost surely finite. Moreover, the collection of spins at (x, si) are
independent, determined from the spins of different vertices at time 0. It is
straightforward to deduce that
P (Ys(x) := Ys0(x) = Ys1(x) = · · ·= Ysi(x))→ 0 as i→∞
since each type occurs initially with positive probability. The lemma follows.

Lemma 5. There is almost sure extinction of the 0-edges, that is,
lim
t→∞
P (X¯t(e) = 0) = 0 for all e ∈E.
Proof. First of all, we observe that, since the initial configuration, as
well as the evolution rules of the process, are translation invariant in space,
the probability of edge e being a 0-edge at time t does not depend on the
specific choice of e. This key property is implicitly used repeatedly in the
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proof of the lemma. Now, we let 0 < s < t <∞, and partition the set of
0-edges at time t into the subset Ω− of those edges that have been lately
updated by time s and the subset Ω+ of those edges that have been lately
updated after time s, namely
Ω− = {e ∈E : X¯u(e) = 0 for all u ∈ (s, t)},
Ω+ = {e ∈E : X¯t(e) = 0 and X¯u(e) = 1 for some u ∈ (s, t)}.
Note that an update at vertex x in the Axelrod model corresponds to the
simultaneous update of the pair of edges incident to this vertex. In addition,
the culture at x flips at a positive rate if and only if x has exactly one feature
in common with one of its two nearest neighbors, that is, if and only if at
least one of both edges incident to x is a 1-edge. Also, since only one feature
changes at a time, when an edge pair is updated, the weight of each edges
varies by exactly one unit. In particular, accounting for symmetry, there are
only four possible transitions of the edge pairs:
(1,0)→ (2,1), (1,1)→ (2,0), (1,1)→ (2,2), (1,2)→ (2,1).
It follows that the probability of e being a 1-edge is nonincreasing (this can
be seen from the fact that the 1-edges evolve according to a system of annihi-
lating random walks) and that a 0-edge can only result from the annihilation
of two 1-edges. This, together with Lemma 3 which claims extinction of the
1-edges, implies that, for all ε > 0, there exists s large such that
2×P (e ∈Ω+)≤ P (X¯s(e) = 1)≤ ε.
Time s being fixed, Lemma 4 implies the existence of t > s such that
P (e= {x,x+1} ∈Ω−) = P (Xiu(x) 6=Xiu(x+ 1) for all u ∈ (s, t) and i= 1,2)
≤ P (Yu(x) = Yu(x+1) for all u ∈ (s, t))
≤ P (Yu(x) = Ys(x) for all u ∈ (s, t))≤ ε.
Combining the previous two estimates, we obtain that, for all ε > 0 small,
there exists a large but finite time s > 0 and a large but finite time t > s
such that
P (X¯t(e) = 0) = P (e ∈Ω+) +P (e ∈Ω−)≤ 2ε,
which establishes extinction of the 0-edges. 
Having established that both sets of 0-edges and 1-edges go extinct, the
proof of Theorem 1 is now straightforward, and follows the lines of Lemma 3.
While the latter shows that clustering of the voter model implies extinction
of the 1-edges, the last step is to prove that, conversely, extinction of type 0
and type 1 edges implies clustering of the Axelrod model. Fix x < y, and let
z0 = x < z1 < · · ·< zk = y with k = |x− y|.
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Denote by ei = {zi, zi+1} the edge connecting vertex zi and vertex zi+1.
Then, extinction of both the 1-edges and the 0-edges given, respectively, by
Lemmas 3 and 5 implies that
lim
t→∞
P (Xt(x) 6=Xt(y))
≤ lim
t→∞
P (Xt(zi) 6=Xt(zi+1) for some i= 0,1, . . . , k− 1)
≤ lim
t→∞
k−1∑
i=0
P (X¯t(ei) = 0 or X¯t(ei) = 1) = 0.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
3. Proof of Theorem 2. This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2
which again relies on the analysis of the agreements along the edges rather
than the actual opinion at each vertex. Before going into the details of the
proof, we briefly introduce its main steps. First, it is noted in Lemma 6 that
the process on a finite graph reaches almost surely one of its absorbing states
which consist of the configurations in which each edge has either weight zero
or weight F . The ultimate number of cultural domains on a path-like graph
is roughly equal to the ultimate number of edges with weight zero, so the
strategy is to bound from below the number of such edges. To do so, we
introduce
W (t) :=
F∑
j=0
jWj(t) where Wj(t) := card{e ∈E : X¯t(e) = j}
and where X¯t(e) is defined as in the previous section. In words, W (t) keeps
track of the total number of agreements in the system. Let y be a vertex
with degree 2, and let x and z be its two nearest neighbors. Then, we observe
that if the individual at vertex y updates its culture at time t by mimicking
the ith feature of vertex x, then we have the following alternatives:
(0) W (t)−W (t−) = 0 whenever Xit−(y) =Xit−(z).
(1) W (t)−W (t−) = 1 whenever Xit−(x) 6=Xit−(z) and Xit−(y) 6=Xit−(z).
(2) W (t)−W (t−) = 2 whenever Xit−(x) =Xit−(z).
The first key step is to prove that if the ith feature of vertex y differs from
the ith feature of both of its neighbors (cases 1 and 2 above), then the ith
feature of vertex x and the ith feature of vertex z are independent, which is
established in Lemma 7. It follows that
P (W (t)−W (t−) = 2|W (t) 6=W (t−))≤ (q − 1)−1
as stated in Lemma 8. Note that two nearest neighbors, say y and z, cannot
interact as long as they are connected by an edge with weight zero; there-
fore edges with weight zero can possibly change their state only when two
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agreements emerge simultaneously (case 2 above). This, together with the
previous inequality, leads us to consider the following urn problem which
is also based on an idea initially introduced in [9]. There are F + 1 boxes
labeled from box 0 to box F containing all together a total of N balls, which
corresponds to the number of edges. The game starts with as many balls in
box j as there are edges with weight j in the Axelrod model at time 0, and
evolves in discrete time according to the following stochastic rules:
(1) At each time step, we move a ball from box j to box j+1 where (if it
exists) box j is chosen uniformly at random from the set of nonempty inner
boxes.
(2) In case a ball has indeed been moved, and box 0 is nonempty, we
move an additional ball from box 0 to box 1 only with probability (q−1)−1.
(3) The game halts when all the inner boxes are empty.
Here, inner boxes refer to boxes 1,2, . . . , F−1. Using coupling arguments and
the inequality established in Lemma 8, we prove that the expected number
of balls in box 0 when the game halts is larger than the expected number of
edges with weight zero in the Axelrod model when the system gets trapped.
This is done in Lemma 9. Finally, the lower bound of Theorem 2 is proved
to be a lower bound for the expected number of balls in box 0 when the
game halts, and thus a lower bound for the expected value of the ultimate
number of domains, in Lemmas 10 and 11. The key to keeping track of the
number of balls in box 0 is to divide the game into rounds and paint the
balls with two different colors at the beginning of each round.
Lemma 6. We have limt→∞N(t)−W0(t) = 1.
Proof. The number N(t) of cultural domains at time t is the number
of connected components of the graph obtained by removing all edges whose
weight at time t differs from F . In the case of a finite tree, this results in
a forest whose number of connected components is equal to the number of
edges removed plus one, from which it follows that
N(t) =W0(t) +W1(t) + · · ·+WF−1(t) + 1.
Since the Axelrod model on a finite graph converges to one of its absorbing
states and that each absorbing state is characterized by all the edges having
weight either zero or F , we also have
lim
t→∞
Wj(t) = 0 for j = 1,2, . . . , F − 1.
The result follows. 
Lemma 7. Let 0≤ x < y < z ≤N and fix i ∈ {1,2, . . . , F}. Then
P (Xit(x) =X
i
t(z)|Xit (x) 6=Xit(y) and Xit(y) 6=Xit(z)) = (q − 1)−1.
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Proof. The idea is that, given that the pairs {x, y} and {y, z} disagree
on their ith feature, the states of this feature for x and z must originate
from different vertices at time 0. To make this argument rigorous, we first
construct the Axelrod model graphically from collections of independent
random variables: for each oriented edge e= (u, v) and n≥ 1:
(1) Tn(e) is the nth arrival time of a Poisson process with rate 1/2;
(2) Un(e) is the discrete random variable uniformly distributed over {1,
2, . . . , F};
(3) Vn(e) = {Vn,k(e) :k ≥ 1} is an infinite sequence of independent random
variables which are uniformly distributed over the set of features {1,2, . . . , F}.
The process starting from any initial configuration is constructed inductively
as follows. Assume that the process has been constructed up to time t−
where t= Tn(e), and let
It−(e) = It−((u, v)) = {i :Xit−(u) =Xit−(v)}
and
Jt−(e) = {i :Xit−(u) 6=Xit−(v)}.
In words, the sets It−(e) and Jt−(e) are the sets of features for which the
vertices u and v agree and disagree, respectively. Then we have the following
alternative:
(1) if Un(e) ∈ It−(e) and Jt−(e) 6=∅, then we draw an arrow from u to v
at time t;
(2) if Un(e) ∈ Jt−(e) or Jt−(e) =∅, then we do nothing.
Thinking of an arrow oriented from u to v as representing an interaction
that causes vertex v to mimic one of the features of u, and noticing that
P (Un(e) ∈ It−(e)) = 1
F
card(It−(e)) =
1
F
F∑
i=1
1{Xit−(u) =Xit−(v)},
this indicates that, as required, adjacent vertices with different cultures in-
teract at a rate proportional to the number of features they share. To com-
plete the construction, the last step is to use the random variables Vn,k(e)
to determine the feature vertex v mimics on the event that 1 above occurs.
To choose this feature uniformly at random from Jt−(e), as required, we let
m= inf{k ≥ 1 :Vn,k(e) ∈ Jt−(e)} and i= Vn,m(e)
and label the arrow with an i to indicate that the ith feature of v at time t is
set equal to the ith feature of vertex u. Since the network of interactions is
finite, the times of the Poisson events can be ordered; therefore the Axelrod
model can be constructed going forward in time using the previous rules.
However, an idea of Harris [7] allows us as well to construct the process on
THE AXELROD MODEL FOR THE DISSEMINATION OF CULTURE REVISITED15
Fig. 2. Pictures related to the proof of Theorem 2—lineages in the Axelrod model on the
left-hand side, and schematic illustration of a single step evolution of the urn problem on
the right-hand side.
infinite lattices in the same manner. Given an initial configuration in which
features are independent and uniformly distributed, and the collections of
independent random variables introduced above, we draw the arrows along
with their label up to time t following the rules previously described. Then
we say that there is an i-lineage from (u, t) to (w, t− s) if there are
s0 = t− s < s1 < · · ·< sn+1 = t and u0 =w,u1, . . . , un = u
such that the following two conditions hold:
(1) for j = 1,2, . . . , n, there is an i-arrow from uj−1 to uj at time sj ;
(2) for j = 0,1, . . . , n, the segment {uj} × (sj, sj+1) does not contain any
tips of i-arrow.
Note that for all s ∈ (0, t), there exists a unique vertex w such that (1)
and (2) hold. We define the process that keeps track of the unique i-lineage
starting at (u, t) by letting
Xˆis(u, t) = {w: there is an i-lineage from (u, t) to (w, t− s)},
and refer the reader to Figure 2 for an illustration. Although i-lineages in the
Axelrod model are somewhat reminiscent of dual paths in the voter model,
the latter can be constructed from the graphical representation regardless
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of the initial configuration, whereas the construction of the former also de-
pends on the initial configuration, since one needs to construct the process
forward in time up to time t in order to identify the labels on the arrows.
In particular, the culture of a given space–time point cannot be determined
from the initial configuration by simply going backward in time along the
graphical representation. However, by construction, one has
Xit(u) =X
i
t−s(Xˆ
i
s(u, t)) =X
i
0(Xˆ
i
t(u, t)) for all 0≤ s≤ t
from which it follows that
Xit(y) /∈ {Xit(x),Xit (z)} implies Xˆit(y, t) /∈ {Xˆit (x, t), Xˆit(z, t)}.
Moreover, after the random labels on the arrows have been determined by
constructing the process up to time t, the system of i-lineages is constructed
from the set of i-arrows in the same manner as the system of dual paths in
the voter model. Due, in addition, to the presence of one-dimensional nearest
neighbor interactions, it is straightforward to deduce that, regardless of the
random configuration of the i-arrows, the dynamics preserve the order of
the i-lineages in the sense that
Xˆis(x, t)≤ Xˆis(y, t)≤ Xˆis(z, t) for all 0≤ s≤ t.
Combining the previous two properties, we deduce that
Xit(y) /∈ {Xit(x),Xit (z)} implies Xˆit(x, t)< Xˆit(y, t)< Xˆit(z, t),
indicating that the ith feature of vertex x and the ith feature of vertex z
at time t are determined by the initial ith features of two different vertices.
Since these features are independent and uniformly distributed at time 0,
we obtain that, for all q1, q2 6=Xit(y),
P (Xit(x) = q1 and X
i
t(z) = q2|Xit(x) 6=Xit(y) and Xit(y) 6=Xit(z))
= P (Xi0(Xˆ
i
t(x, t)) = q1 and X
i
0(Xˆ
i
t(z, t)) = q2|Xˆit(x, t) 6= Xˆit(z, t)
and Xit(x) 6=Xit(y) and Xit(y) 6=Xit(z))
= (q − 1)−2.
The lemma follows by summing over all the q− 1 possible values of q1 = q2.

Lemma 8. We have P (W (t)−W (t−) = 2|W (t) 6=W (t−))≤ (q − 1)−1.
Proof. First, we observe that there exist n≥ 1 and e= (x, y) such that
t= Tn(e) on the conditional event that the total number of agreements in-
creases at time t. Then we construct the process up to time t− using the
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collection of independent random variables and following the rules intro-
duced in Lemma 7 in order to identify the set
Jt−(e) = {1≤ i≤ F :Xit−(x) 6=Xit−(y)},
which is nonempty on the event that W (t) 6=W (t−). Note that if vertex y
is at the boundary of the system, then only the weight of edge e is updated
at time t; therefore
P (W (t)−W (t−) = 2|W (t) 6=W (t−)) = 0 whenever y = 0 or y =N.
To deal with the nontrivial case when vertex y has degree 2, observe that
{W (t)−W (t−) = 2} ∩ {Vn,m(e) = i}= {Xit−(x) =Xit−(z)} ∩ {Vn,m(e) = i},
{W (t) 6=W (t−)} ∩ {Vn,m(e) = i}= {Xit−(y) 6=Xit−(z)} ∩ {Vn,m(e) = i},
where vertex z is the unique nearest neighbor of y different from x and
where m is defined in the construction of the process given in Lemma 7.
Since the random variables Vn,k, k ≥ 1, are independent of the configuration
of the system at time t−, we have in addition that
P (Xit−(x) =X
i
t−(z)|Xit−(y) 6=Xit−(z) and Vn,m(e) = i)
= P (Xit−(x) =X
i
t−(z)|Xit−(y) 6=Xit−(z) and i ∈ Jt−(e)).
Combining the previous two properties, we deduce that
P (W (t)−W (t−) = 2|W (t) 6=W (t−) and Vn,m(e) = i)
= P (Xit−(x) =X
i
t−(z)|W (t) 6=W (t−) and Vn,m(e) = i)
= P (Xit−(x) =X
i
t−(z)|Xit−(y) 6=Xit−(z) and Vn,m(e) = i)
= P (Xit−(x) =X
i
t−(z)|Xit−(y) 6=Xit−(z) and i ∈ Jt−(e))
= P (Xit−(x) =X
i
t−(z)|Xit−(x) 6=Xit−(y) and Xit−(y) 6=Xit−(z))
= (q − 1)−1,
where the last equality follows from Lemma 7. This completes the proof. 
As previously mentioned, to find a lower bound for the expected value
of the ultimate number of edges with weight zero, we need to compare the
number of such edges with the ultimate number of balls in box 0 for the
game described at the beginning of this section. To do so, the first step is
to couple the Axelrod dynamics with another urn problem that evolves in
continuous-time. As previously, we start with as many balls in box j as there
are edges with weight j in the Axelrod model at time 0, but the evolution
is now coupled with the cultural dynamics as follows:
(0) if W (t)−W (t−) = 0, we do nothing;
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(1) if W (t)−W (t−) = 1, we move a ball from box j to box j + 1 where
(if it exists), box j is chosen uniformly at random from the set of nonempty
inner boxes;
(2) if W (t)−W (t−) = 2, we repeat the same as in 1 above, and, in case
a ball has indeed been moved and box 0 is nonempty, we move another ball
from box 0 to box 1.
The game halts when the Axelrod model hits an absorbing state, that is,
when all the edges have either weight zero or weight F . Let Bj(t) denote
the number of balls in box j at time t. The next lemma indicates that, at
any time, the number of balls in box 0 is smaller than the number of edges
with weight zero in the Axelrod model.
Lemma 9. For all t≥ 0, we have B0(t)≤W0(t).
Proof. The intuition behind the result is that a ball is removed from
box 0 if and only if two agreements emerge simultaneously in the Axelrod
model, whereas the latter is only a necessary condition for an edge with
weight zero to change its weight. To make this argument rigorous, we in-
troduce the key variable B¯(t) that represents the number of steps required
after time t to move all the balls to box F , excluding the ones which are in
box 0 at time t, along with its analog for the Axelrod model that we denote
by W¯ (t). More precisely, we introduce
B¯(t) :=
F∑
j=1
(F − j)Bj(t) and W¯ (t) :=
F∑
j=1
(F − j)Wj(t).
Then, the idea is to prove by induction that, as long as box 0 is nonempty
(note that once it is empty the result is trivial), we have
B0(t)≤W0(t) and B¯(t)≥ W¯ (t).
The two inequalities to be proved are obviously true at time 0 since initially
there are as many balls in box j as there are edges with weight j. Assume
that they are true at time t− and that a culture is updated at time t. Since
W¯ (t) = F × (N −W0(t))−
F∑
j=1
jWj(t) = F × (N −W0(t))−W (t),
and a weight jumps from 0 to 1 at time t only ifW (t)−W (t−) = 2, we have:
(1) Assume that W (t)−W (t−) = 0. Then
B0(t) =B0(t−)≤W0(t−) =W0(t),
B¯(t) = B¯(t−)≥ W¯ (t−) = F × (N −W0(t))−W (t) = W¯ (t).
(2) Assume that W (t)−W (t−) = 1. Then W¯ (t−)> 0 and so B¯(t−)> 0
by assumption. In particular, one of the inner boxes is nonempty, which
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implies that a ball is indeed moved from some box j to box j+1. It follows
that
B0(t) =B0(t−)≤W0(t−) =W0(t),
B¯(t) = B¯(t−)− 1≥ W¯ (t−)− 1 = F × (N −W0(t−))−W (t−)− 1
= F × (N −W0(t))−W (t) = W¯ (t).
(3) Assume that W (t)−W (t−) = 2. In case box 0 is empty at time t−,
the result is trivial. Otherwise, using as previously that B¯(t−)≥ W¯ (t−)> 0,
we obtain
B0(t) =B0(t−)− 1≤W0(t−)− 1≤W0(t),
B¯(t) = B¯(t−)− 1 + (F − 1)≥ W¯ (t−)− 1 + (F − 1)
= F × (N −W0(t−))−W (t) + F
≥ F × (N −W0(t)− 1)−W (t) + F = W¯ (t).
This completes the proof. 
Lemma 10. For all j = 0,1, . . . , F , we have
E(Wj(0)) =Npj :=N
(
F
j
)
q−j(1− q−1)F−j .
Proof. Since initially nearest neighbors agree on each of their features
with probability q−1 and that all features are independent, the probability
that a given edge is a j-edge is
P (X = j) where X ∼ Binomial(F, q−1).
Since the graph contains N edges, the result follows. 
Lemma 11. Assume that F < q. Then
N−1 lim
t→∞
E(W0(t))≥
(
1− 1
q
)F
+
F
q −F
((
1− 1
q
)F
−
(
1− 1
q
))
.
Proof. In view of Lemma 9, it suffices to prove the result for B0(t)
instead of W0(t). First, we consider the discrete-time game introduced at
the beginning of this section. To count the number of balls more easily, we
divide the evolution of the latter into rounds as follows.
Round 1. We paint in black all the balls in box 0 and in white all the
other balls and, at each time step, move a white ball from box j to box j+1
where (if it exists) box j is chosen uniformly at random from the set of inner
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boxes that contain at least one white ball. In case a white ball has indeed
been moved, and box 0 is nonempty, we move a black ball from box 0 to
box 1 with probability (q − 1)−1. The round halts when all the white balls
are in box F .
Round 2. Note that, at the end of round 1, all the boxes are empty but
boxes 0 and 1 that contain only black balls, and box F that contains only
white balls. We paint in white all the balls in box 1 after which the game
evolves as described in round 1.
Any other round is defined starting from the final configuration of the pre-
vious round in the same way as round 2 is defined starting from the final
configuration of round 1, and the game halts when all the balls are either in
box 0 or box F . We refer the reader to the right-hand side of Figure 2 for
a schematic illustration of a single step evolution. Note that, letting Aj(t)
denote the number of balls in box j at step t for this game, it follows from
Lemma 8 that
lim
t→∞
E(A0(t))≤ lim
t→∞
E(B0(t)),
whenever
Aj(0) =Bj(0) for j = 0,1, . . . , F ;
therefore it suffices to bound from below the limit on the left-hand side.
Let Tk denote the time at which round k halts. Since F −j steps are required
to move a white ball from box j to box F , and all the white balls are either
in box 1 or box F at the beginning of round k ≥ 2,
T1 =
F∑
j=1
(F − j)Aj(0) and Tk+1 = Tk + (F − 1)A1(Tk).
The expression of time T1 together with Lemma 10 implies that
E(T1) =
F∑
j=1
(F − j)E(Aj(0)) =
F∑
j=1
(F − j)Npj
=
F∑
j=0
(F − j)Npj −NFp0
=NF (1− p0)−N
F∑
j=0
jpj
=NF
(
1−
(
1− 1
q
)F
− 1
q
)
.
In other respects, in view of the expression of time Tk+1, and since at each
step a black ball is moved from box 0 to box 1 with probability (q − 1)−1,
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we also have
E(A1(Tk+1)) =
(
F − 1
q− 1
)
E(A1(Tk)) =
(
F − 1
q− 1
)k
E(A1(T1)).
Combining the previous two equations, we obtain
E(A1(Tk+1)) =
(
F − 1
q− 1
)k 1
q− 1E(T1)
=N
(
F
q− 1
)(
F − 1
q− 1
)k(
1−
(
1− 1
q
)F
− 1
q
)
.
Finally, using again Lemma 10 and some basic algebra, we deduce that
N−1 lim
t→∞
E(W0(t))
≥N−1 lim
t→∞
E(A0(t))≥N−1
(
E(A0(0))−
∞∑
k=1
E(A1(Tk))
)
≥
(
1− 1
q
)F
−
∞∑
k=0
(
F
q − 1
)(
F − 1
q− 1
)k(
1−
(
1− 1
q
)F
− 1
q
)
≥
(
1− 1
q
)F
+
F
q −F
((
1− 1
q
)F
−
(
1− 1
q
))
.
This completes the proof. 
Theorem 2 directly follows from the combination of Lemmas 6 and 11.
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